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Introduction
It can be quite jarring when we encounter someone with beliefs radically divergent from
our own, especially when they are invective or pernicious. Worse still is the experience of
encountering one so confident in their convictions that they doggedly refuse to provide any
justification for their claims or engage in any sort of deliberation about them. When someone
loudly confronts you with the assertation that modern medicine is made up of a series of
malicious lies perpetuated by bad actors, you may step away from the experience not only with
the conviction that this person is deeply misguided, but that they are potentially harmful to those
around them. You may marvel at the fact that in a world of readily available and widely
circulated evidence to the contrary, this person has maintained such wildly fanatical beliefs
against all odds. You may also wonder what exactly is wrong with such a state of affairs, and
who is to blame for it. Are such people all malignant extremists with some sort of vendetta
against truth, or are they a victim of some wrongdoing? Should you approach them with
indignation or pity? What has gone wrong here?
I have been deeply troubled by such questions. Beliefs occupy a powerful role in all
aspects of our lives and are essential to many of the most impactful realms of human activity. All
intellectual, political, and social activity relies on the stable function of our belief practices, and
our everyday experience certainly reflects this. At times, we find it fitting to hold people
responsible for the beliefs they develop, and if these beliefs are in some way bad or incorrect, to
blame them for them. However, this is in tension with the popular sentiment that opinions are
open to (mostly) free adoption and expression. So long as your beliefs do not directly harm
someone (e.g. forms of violent bigotry), it does not seem fit to vocally censure or punish a
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stranger for the beliefs they hold, even if they are completely unfounded or somewhat
problematic- “that’s just my opinion” is usually a viable defense.
These observations led me to question our ordinary belief practice, and to attempt to find
some consistency within it and find out what an ideal belief practice should look like. If an
unfounded belief is not directly harmful, can we hold someone responsible for adopting it? Can
we blame them for it? If so, in virtue of what are we responsible for our beliefs? Which ones can
we be blamed for adopting? Above all, how can we be good believers, how can we be
responsible believers?
In this work I will attempt to answer each of these questions in the order that I have
presented them. I will begin with a chapter on doxastic responsibility (that is, responsibility for
our beliefs). Following accounts by Angela Smith and Robert Carry Osborne, I will conclude
that we are in fact responsible for the extreme majority of our beliefs, including those over which
we exercise little to no control. I will then follow this chapter with one on doxastic blame,
arguing that blame directed at beliefs is a species of protest aimed at the violation of epistemic
norms. I will argue that such protest is grounded and legitimized by the liability to harm that
epistemically flawed beliefs (even those which are not apparently malignant) expose those
around us to. I will conclude that chapter by arguing that unlike doxastic responsibility, doxastic
blame is indeed mitigated by the amount of control we have over the development and
maintenance of our blameworthy beliefs.
In the final two chapters, I will apply these analyses of responsibility and blame to
questions regarding when we are blameworthy for our beliefs, and how we can minimize such
blameworthiness. Put differently, these chapters will consider what obligations we have as
believers, and how we can best fulfill them (i.e. how we can be responsible believers). I will
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argue that all beliefs which we can be blamed for developing result from forms of epistemic
akrasia or carelessness. From this observation, I will conclude that the best means available to us
to become responsible believers is to cultivate a virtue of epistemic conscientiousness, that is,
care applied to our epistemic activities which prioritizes the truth over all other interests.
In the course of these chapters, I build on the work of Rik Peels and Robert Carry
Osborne. Peels has offered an account of responsible belief which answers the questions above
in a way I found mostly satisfactory. In a recent paper, Osborne offers an account of doxastic
responsibility based heavily on the intuition that we are social creatures who rely on one another
to be reliable trackers of information. When we fail to do so, we put others around us at risk of
(sometimes) serious harms; Osborne legitimizes near universal responsibility for beliefs upon
this intuition.
Osborne’s intuition that our interpersonal status is the grounding for many of our
responsibilities and obligations is one which I think cannot be understated, and one which has
not received adequate treatment in the recent literature. Many of my conclusions in this work
will be in some way based upon or motivated by this fact. Peels’ account, while generally
adequate in its approach, fails to properly appreciate this interpersonal dimension of our doxastic
lives. Accordingly, I describe the account offered below as a synthesis of these accounts.
An important note should be made about the scope of this work. In attempting to figure
out which beliefs we can be blamed for holding, I will not be considering how we should go
about regulating such beliefs in practice. The intersection between respect for the autonomy of
others and instituting a more ideal belief practice is a challenging area, and one I have neither the
space nor the knowledge to treat properly. I will have little to nothing to say about how we
should handle encountering such beliefs in others. Instead, I will say much about which beliefs
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are blameworthy, why we can be blamed for them, and how we can navigate our own doxastic
lives in a way that minimizes such blame. In doing so, I hope to provide a means by which we
can become more responsible believers.
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1. Doxastic Responsibility
Before we consider how one believes responsibly, we will have to consider what it means
to be responsible for a belief. Is it appropriate to attribute responsibility to beliefs, and if so what
conditions must hold in order to do so? Does doxastic responsibility (that is, responsibility for
beliefs) come in degrees, and does it ever disappear entirely? To answer such questions, in this
chapter I will attempt to provide an account of doxastic responsibility. I will then use that
account to articulate the necessary conditions for doxastic responsibility, and when it is
diminished or heightened.
Many accounts of responsibility (doxastic or otherwise) require that an agent have some
form of control over a belief in order to be responsible for it, following the principle “oughtimplies-can.” I will spend much of this chapter arguing to the contrary that control is not
requisite for doxastic responsibility. Instead, following accounts given by Angela Smith and
Robert Carry Osborne I will argue that doxastic responsibility should be regarded as a form of
answerability which is independent of control. I will first consider arguments which require
varying forms of control for doxastic responsibility. After advancing my objections to these
accounts, I will continue to consider accounts on which doxastic responsibility does not require
control. I will conclude by endorsing an account recently provided by Robert Carry Osborne,
which ultimately grounds doxastic responsibility in the potential beliefs have to harm others in
one’s epistemic community.
Doxastic Responsibility and Control
For the sake of clarity, I will begin with a definition of responsibility simpliciter
borrowed from Rik Peels. To say that an agent is responsible for an act or belief is to say that it is
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appropriate to normatively evaluate them for that act or belief. 1 In considering accounts which
require control for doxastic responsibility, I will begin with two well-known characterizations of
control over beliefs. As originally distinguished by William Alston, direct control involves an
agent coming to believe that p by an act of will while indirect control involves an agent
executing action(s) that bring it about that they believe that p.2
Those who claim we have direct control occupy the more extreme position, which entails
that we are at least sometimes capable of confronting a given proposition p and simply deciding
to believe p or ~p. With clear cut cases, direct control is fairly easily refuted. Alston provides a
now famous counterexample to such claims, claiming that one cannot for an arbitrarily large sum
of money believe that the U.S is still a colony of Great Britain. 3 One may be able to bring it
about that I have such a belief through a rigorous project of self-deception in order to obtain the
money, but one cannot simply will that they have this belief for such prudential reasons. 4
The natural move for an advocate of direct control here is simply to limit the scope of
directly controllable beliefs to those which are not obviously true or false. Neil Levy attempts to
undermine this strategy by considering instances where our evidence weighs approximately
equally for competing beliefs. He argues that in such instances we are equally powerless to
directly choose between such competing beliefs. 5 Instead, we will often simply assume one
belief or the other out of necessity. In cases where we end up favoring one belief over the other,
Levy argues that we never directly decide upon one. Instead we first perform necessary acts as
dismissing our doubts or evidence, which in turn bring it about that we believe. 6 This precludes
1

Rik Peels,
William Alston, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justifucation,” Philosophical Perspectives 2, (1988):
260.
3
Alston, 263.
4
Ibid.
5
Levy, 137.
6
Levy, 138.
2
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the possibility of direct control over such equally supported beliefs, and instead suggests that we
utilize indirect control in such cases.
Given such refutations, one might regard indirect control as a more plausible alternative.
Advocates of indirect doxastic control maintain that we can come to develop a belief that p
through an action or series of actions. This is often analogized to other states of affairs we are
responsible for maintaining through some series of practical actions. I am responsible for how
long and unkempt my hair is despite the fact that I cannot will that it be neat and trimmed on a
whim; still, I can schedule an appointment at the barber or cut and comb it myself.
Many find this form of control over our beliefs plausible, and I am inclined to agree. This
category of belief could include such projects as intentional acts of self-deception, or more
mundane cases of impulsive or biased thinking: I may want to believe that materialism is true
and in order to do so seek out especially well formulated arguments for it and make sure I
encounter only weak objections against it.
However, few find this a convincing form of control on which to ground doxastic
responsibility. Say that in a local election for dairy inspector I believe candidate A is more
aligned with my interests than candidate B. If doxastic responsibility is grounded in indirect
control, then it seems I am responsible for my false hope in A because I failed to recognize B
early on and bring it about that I believe she better represents my interests, perhaps by shutting
myself off from any and all evidence to the contrary. Such responsibility does not seem
instructive in any epistemically appealing way, and the reasons one might have for choosing one
belief early on rather than another remain mysterious. Alston articulates this point well: “To try
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to get oneself to believe that p, prior to being in a good position to tell whether p is true or not, is
not a procedure to be commended from the epistemic standpoint.” 7
Even if one admits that such projects may sometimes be a clearly preferred course of
action for moral or prudential reasons, such cases are certainly the exception and cannot serve as
general ground for doxastic responsibility. The fact that I am in principle capable of indirectly
arriving at beliefs by choice thus seems unrelated to any responsibility we normally ascribe to
beliefs.
The common thread between these direct and indirect varieties of control is their
directedness towards a specific belief that p. I would locate the weakness of the above accounts
in this intentionality. To put it more directly, I would argue that doxastic responsibility cannot be
grounded in our ability to intentionally develop a specific belief. Still, this does not exhaust the
options available for doxastic responsibility based on doxastic control. For one can still
intentionally impact the way they acquire beliefs without intentionally acquiring any specific
beliefs. A much stronger position along these lines has been extensively developed by Rik Peels.
As above, Peels argues that while we cannot intentionally direct ourselves towards any
given belief, we still exert control over the beliefs we acquire through what he calls indirect
influence. More rigorously, Peels says that we have this sort of influence over belief when we
cannot intentionally believe that p, but we can intentionally perform an action that determines
whether we believe that p.8 Say for example I currently believe that human hearing does not
detect frequencies greater than 20kHz. I could seek out and listen to a 21kHz tone to test my
belief; should I hear it, I would reject my original belief. Therefore, there are actions I could

7
8

Alston, 273.
Peels, 90.
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voluntarily perform that would determine whether I believe p or ~p without intending to believe
either.
Peels argues that this indirect influence is generative of what he calls “intellectual
obligations.” One has an intellectual obligation to perform an action if failure to perform that
action will lead one to acquire beliefs that are in some way bad, whether objectively or
subjectively. In other words, if one has a belief when they should not, they have at some point
violated an intellectual obligation.9
With this account, Peels capably avoids requiring the intentionality I noted was a
weakness in the above views built upon indirect and direct control. However, I do not think this
makes his account wholly secure. When we assign responsibility to someone because their
actions have led to some bad outcome, we generally set some limit on how far such
responsibility can extend. If I cut down a tree on someone else’s property, I am responsible for a
number of things: property damage, trespassing, etc. Still, I am not responsible for every bad
outcome that is causally linked to my vandalistic behavior. I could reasonably be expected to
appreciate that removing that tree decreased the property value, deprived the owner of its shade,
and perhaps even some fruit. Given this, it seems abundantly clear that I am responsible for such
losses. However, nobody could reasonably hold me responsible if the owner developed
melanoma thirty years later from increased sun exposure; this remains true even if had the tree
remained standing he would have remained healthy. Likewise, I am not responsible for
preventing his car from being totaled even if for a certainty the tree would have fell on his car in
a storm that very week had it remained standing.

9

Peels, 99.
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Likewise, in the realm of belief it seems our responsibility for having good or bad beliefs
does not ultimately bottom out in some failure to meet our intellectual obligations. This remains
true even if (as Peels requires) fulfilling those obligations would unequivocally have avoided
acquiring that belief. Just as one cannot always anticipate the outcome of some action, epistemic
failings often have unexpected consequences. One could easily violate some intellectual
obligation end up in a better position practically, morally, or even epistemically just by
circumstance. Or vice-versa, one could fulfill their intellectual obligations with superhuman
reliability and still end up with beliefs that are in some way bad. What I hope to emphasize with
such examples is the fact that intentionally commiting some act does not always render one
responsible for its outcome.
Peels attempts to meet this objection of “doxastic luck” with a caveat to his original
formulation of intellectual obligations: responsibility does not apply in cases where the belief
formation is accidental to their fulfillment or violation of intellectual obligations. 10 While this
does make Peels’ account extensionally appropriate, it is hard not to see it as ad hoc. Given his
account, Peels is naturally concerned with retaining the idea that our resourcefulness as epistemic
agents determines our quality as believers; this position becomes hard to maintain if it seems that
a not insignificant portion of our beliefs are acquired not as a result of the vicissitudes of fate.
Doxastic Responsibility without Control
In the above section, I have argued extensively against grounding doxastic responsibility
in different forms of control. To reiterate, I do think that we are able to intentionally develop
beliefs by the indirect process described above (though it is very likely inadvisable to do so). I
also think that the indirect influences Peels grounds doxastic responsibility in are both in our

10

Peels, 217.
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control and massively shape which beliefs we form and how we are evaluated for forming them.
However, if one finds the above issues with these control-based accounts compelling, they
should not think that any of these accounts provide a compelling ground on which to base
doxastic responsibility.
The motivation for requiring control for responsibility is intuitive; it seems almost
oppressive to hold someone responsible for states of affairs they have no capacity to prevent. For
this reason, there is a high burden for those who want to attribute responsibility to believers
regardless of their control over their beliefs. I will consider two such analyses of responsible
belief offered by Angela Smith and Robert Carry Osborne. By outlining these accounts, I hope to
demonstrate that for many states of affairs we retain responsibility despite a total lack of control.
Smith’s account of responsibility is built upon an analysis of responsibility as
answerability. Smith argues that many of our attitudes (not just beliefs) are essentially
evaluative: they reveal “what we judge to be of value, importance, or significance.” 11 Smith
concludes that if a mental activity is rationally connected to some such evaluation, one can
reasonably be asked to acknowledge and defend the judgements it implies; reasons can be
demanded as to why they hold the views indicated by their mental attitude. 12 For Smith, being
the appropriate target of these reasonable demands (i.e. being answerable for these mental
activities) is a form of responsibility.13
One may worry that this contradicts my provided definition of responsibility (i.e.
responsibility consists in being the target of appropriate normative evaluations). If I have a
mental attitude of malice, that attitude is rationally connected to the commitment that the object

11

Angela Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (no.2), 251.
Smith, 256.
13
Smith, 270
12
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of my malice deserves to suffer some evil. This commitment can be normatively evaluated; in
most contexts it will be regarded as reprehensible. It is also clear that beliefs are indicative of our
evaluations and commitments, and thus Smith’s account extends to beliefs.
Note that this account of responsibility for attitudes does not require voluntary control.
Voluntary control is not necessary for answerability, even in cases where there is no voluntary
action I could have committed or not committed to avoid acquiring a certain mental attitude. 14 In
the above example of malice, I am not made evaluable in light of some decision I made in the
past that set me to developing a malicious attitude; I am evaluable based on the content of the
attitude my malice reveals.
However, there is one remaining worry with Smith’s account and others like it. While it
may be true that one can appropriately ask for a justification for someone else’s belief (or some
other mental attitude), there does not seem to be any reason why this represents a demand with
normative force. Robert Carry Osborne raises this worry “Why might I owe it to you to actually
provide my reasons if you demand them? Why should it matter to you what I believe, and what
my reasons are?”15 Put another way, Smith does not seem to offer with her account a reason why
such demands should actually be met.
Osborne argues that in the realm of belief we are often obligated to justify and defend our
beliefs. This is because the information we transmit as believers is critical to various social
projects which depend upon the reliable transmission of information. 16 As a result, if we fail to
(?) fulfill our role as information tracking and transmitting beings poorly, great epistemic and

14

Smith, 263.
Robert Carry Osborne, “A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of
responsibility for belief,” Synthese (2020), 9.
16
Osborne, 11.
15
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practical harms can result.17 Thus, in Osborne’s account we find an alternative grounding for
answerability: believers are subject to normative evaluation through the demands of harmavoidance.18 One cannot simply refuse to participate in the practice of justifying and defending
their beliefs without putting others at risk.
Beyond this difference in grounding, Osborne’s account of doxastic responsibility is
similar to Smith’s account. Like Smith, Osborne regards doxastic responsibility as a form of
answerability. Osborne also notes that this notion of answerability does not require the ability to
change our beliefs.19 Osborne offers his “Rational Situatedness Condition” (RSC) as a slightly
tweaked form of Smith’s account, where one is answerable for holding a belief iff the belief is
“rationally linked to their evaluative judgements, assessments, or dispositions towards activities
like reasoning themselves that have not been implanted in ways that bypass or usurp her rational
capacities.”20 This final caveat represents the only significant difference between Osborne and
Smith’s accounts. With it, Osborne attempts to extend answerability to beliefs which one initially
acquired in ways that usurp their rational capacities (e.g. implanted by a brain surgeon or
hypnotist) but still reveal their evaluative judgements, etc. 21 Thus, on his account we can be
responsible for such beliefs (while they are excluded by Smith’s).
The Limits of Doxastic Responsibility
I’ll now take stock. Given that he does not locate doxastic responsibility in some form of
voluntary control, and improves upon Smith’s otherwise convincing account, I find Osborne’s
account preferrable over others discussed here. I will thus regard doxastic responsibility as a

17

Ibid.
Osborne, 12.
19
Osborne, 8.
20
Osborne, 7.
21
Osborne, 8.
18
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form of answerability for beliefs: we are responsible for beliefs insofar as we are the target of
reasonable demands to justify them. We are in turn obligated to respond to these demands in
virtue of our membership in a wider epistemic community, as refusal to participate in a
responsible epistemic practice puts members of our epistemic community at risk. If we accept
this account, we are in a position to answer the questions originally posed at the start of this
chapter. Namely, what must be true in order for one to be responsible for a belief? Does doxastic
responsibility come in degrees, and does it ever disappear entirely?
The first question has already been rigorously answered by Osborne’s formulation of
RSC. One is answerable (and thus responsible) for any belief which is linked to one’s evaluative
judgements, assessments, etc. The question of whether responsibility is binary or comes in
degrees much more interesting, and much less clear. I see two possible answers given the
contents of the above accounts. We could regard responsibility as a purely binary state. If one is
at all answerable for a belief according to RSC, they are responsible for it. If they are not
answerable, then they have no responsibility for such beliefs. Alternatively, we could admit of
degrees in responsibility. We could apply a level of salience to responsibility, where one can be
somewhere between trivially and significantly responsible for a given belief. I think the latter is
more plausible, as we do not seem to regard ourselves as having equal responsibility for every
belief.
The above accounts lend themselves easily to this concept. Some of the evaluative
commitments/judgements noted by Smith or Osborne are more significant than others. If one of
my mental attitudes or beliefs is rationally connected to my evaluative judgement that the work
of dog surfing instructors is useless, I may be trivially answerable for that belief. In other words,
I’m surely responsible for it, but my lack of appreciation for such an obscure profession is not
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very morally significant. On the other hand, I would be significantly responsible if I believed that
natural disasters are sent by Neptune as a means of selectively removing sinful populations from
the world. The evaluative commitments connected to such a belief have much more significance
than the previous example: they contain the judgement that certain people groups are
cumulatively worse than others, and that in virtue of this they deserve death.
I have used highly reprehensible examples here to make my point, but keep in mind that
attributions of responsibility are not exclusive to or constituted by blameworthiness. To say that
someone is more responsible for holding one belief than another is to say that the moral stakes
are raised. Perhaps Osborne would want to extend this further and argue that doxastic
responsibility increases with the magnitude of potential harm.
The second question concerns whether we can have beliefs for which we are not
responsible. While answerability requires that a belief be rationally connected to one’s evaluative
judgements, it does not seem to be a conceptual necessity that beliefs are always connected in
this way. So, it seems plausible that we could hold some beliefs without being answerable for
them. I imagine beliefs similar (but not identical) to Peels’ so called dormant beliefs can serve as
an example of this. Peels defines dormant beliefs as those beliefs one has had it the past but has
not considered for some time. If however one were asked whether they believe that p when they
believe it dormantly, they would affirm that they believe that p.22
One could for example form a belief that p which is at one time rationally connected to
their evaluative judgements. However, over time their evaluative judgements can independently
change, while they still by habit either truly believe that p or merely respond that they believe
that p when asked.23 If at some later point such beliefs bear no relation to their evaluative

22
23

Peels, 37.
Whether or not such responses are an instance of belief may not be clear.
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judgements and they have yet to realize this, they may not be responsible for believing that p.24
The less realistic cases of belief implantation (e.g. through consuming belief inducing pills or
hypnotism) also provide examples of belief without responsibility. Nevertheless, responsibility is
only eliminated for these beliefs if they bear no relation to the believer’s evaluative judgements.
A natural objection against this and other views grounded in answerability is that they
ascribe responsibility to far too many beliefs. Beyond the two exceptions noted above, there are
very few beliefs for which we are not answerable (and thus responsible). Some will take issue
with the fact that such accounts make responsibility for beliefs nearly inescapable, worrying that
such stringent responsibility is unfair. Smith counters this sentiment well by noting that “being
held responsible is as much a privilege as it is a burden.” 25 It must be remarked that
responsibility is not some dogged judgement we should all want to escape; instead it is a mark of
respect and recognition of us as capable epistemic agents within our larger epistemic community.
Conclusion
I do not think that control over our beliefs is an appropriate ground for doxastic
responsibility. Instead, I characterize doxastic responsibility as a form of answerability: we are
subject as believers to reasonable demands for justification of our beliefs so long as they are
rationally connected to our evaluative commitments. These normative demands are given force
by the potential they have to harm others in our epistemic community if not justified. Thus, while
our responsibility for beliefs comes in varying degrees based on the normative impact they have,
there are very few beliefs for which we lack responsibility altogether.

24

Though they may be responsible for not duly reflecting on whether the belief that p was truly aligned with their
values.
25
Smith, 269.
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2. Doxastic Blame
Having argued above for a notion of doxastic responsibility as answerability, in this
chapter I will begin to expand upon this claim. Above, I used Peels’ definition of responsibility
simpliciter as the state of being appropriately liable to normative evaluations. Likewise, here I
will use Peels’ definitions of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness as the states of being
appropriately liable to positive and negative normative evaluations respectively. 26 Here I am only
concerned with doxastic blame, for three reasons. First, our evaluative practices concerning
beliefs are much more interesting and difficult in the case of blame than in the case of praise or
neutral appraisal. Second, a refined account of doxastic blame is also crucial for answering
certain questions related to responsible belief practices, as I hope to demonstrate in subsequent
chapters. Finally, given that praise and blame are conceptually similar, much of what is said here
concerning blame is still applicable to praise, mutatis mutandis.
In my analysis of doxastic blame, I will begin by emphasizing a distinction between the
evaluation of one as blameworthy and blaming proper. These are distinguished by the fact that
judging one blameworthy is necessary but not sufficient for blaming, which is an act rather than
a judgement.27 A large part of this section will concern what must be added on top of judging
that one is blameworthy to yield an act of blaming. Moreover, some have argued that blame in
the doxastic realm cannot extend beyond the mere observation that one is blameworthy for a
particular belief or set of beliefs. I will argue that on the contrary blame in the doxastic realm can
and does extend beyond the mere evaluation that one is blameworthy for their beliefs, by
appealing once more to Osborne’s observation that harms resulting from faulty beliefs endanger
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one’s epistemic community. These harms ground and legitimize practices of doxastic blame
which extend beyond mere evaluation. I conclude by considering how factors such as degrees of
harms and the believer’s control raise or lower the blame we assign to those who hold particular
beliefs.
Varieties of Blame
In his influential essay “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson noted a tension
between different attitudes we can adopt interpersonal interactions. He distinguishes what he
called the “objective stance” from our normal attitudinal practices where we hold each other
responsible, reacting to each other with attitudes such as resentment or gratitude. 28 I will refer to
the latter category as the “participant stance.” The objective stance represents a policy according
to which one treats others essentially as objects or obstacles to be navigated, accounted for, or
modified.29 Taking an objective stance, I might navigate interpersonal interactions by asking how
I should treat my target to achieve my own ends (or those of society at large) in the most
effective way possible. The participant stance involves some manner of response which engages
with one’s target on a morally active level, i.e. by treating them as a moral agent, with all the
expectations and entitlements which that entails. Often this involves what Strawson calls
“reactive attitudes.” When confronted by someone’s moral failings, attitudes like blame, anger,
or shame in response would be examples of these.
Strawson argues that we cannot conceive of human relations with a purely objective
stance and must engage in attitudes belonging to the participant class when we blame others.
Since Strawson’s essay however, this distinction between the objective and participant stances

28
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has been utilized extensively in literature on blame, and a tension has arisen between competing
camps. Some agree with Strawson that blame cannot be divorced from such participant attitudes
as anger and resentment, while others argue that such attitudes are not necessary for blame.
Andrea Westlund provides an analysis of blame which affords an apt diagnosis for such
debates. Westlund bases her diagnosis on the observation that we engage in many distinct but
related speech acts when we use the word “blame” in everyday contexts. More rigorously,
Westlund notes that blame has a “behabitive” sense when it exhibits attitudes and feelings,
“verdictive” sense when one delivers a (negative) judgement about behavior, and a “exercitive”
sense when it exercises some power of the blamer (e.g. asserting a claim, imposing an obligation,
etc.).30
So, we can mean a variety of things when we say that we blame someone, from
expressing our anger at another’s moral failing to demanding recompense or seeking advice. I
would argue that while some of these instances of blaming require Strawson’s participant
attitudes, for others (such as the exercitive) such attitudes are not necessary. 31 Accordingly, I
claim that we could truly blame someone and remain totally dispassionate when evaluating the
normative content of their acts. Many will not be convinced of the possibility of such
dispassionate evaluative blame. One could argue to the contrary (as Strawson does) that some
modicum of those interpersonal attitudes is necessary for blame regardless of how it is felt or
expressed. In the absence of such attitudes, they would argue that we merely judge the targets of
our evaluations; it is an overstatement to call such acts blaming.
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Angela Smith provides an account of moral blame which addresses such objections.
According to Smith, while the relationship between blaming and such reactive attitudes is one of
close association, it is not one of necessity.32 Smith supports this claim with abundant
counterexamples of cases in which we clearly blame someone for their acts yet remain
dispassionate: one relevant to this discussion is a persistently unreliable friend. After dozens of
instances of a friend falling through, most of us will cease to feel any significant reaction to our
friend’s lack of reliability, yet we can blame them all the same.
So, instead of defining blame in terms of such reactive attitudes, Smith offers two
alternative requirements for blame: the blamer must first believe that the object of their blame is
blameworthy (that is, they must believe that negative normative evaluation is appropriate), and
their blame must be an instance of moral protest against this object.33 By moral protest, Smith
means one adjusting their “attitudes, intentions, and expectations” towards the person they blame
as a way of seeking moral acknowledgement. 34 A simple example of this may be seeking an
apology from someone we blame for a morally reprehensible act. In such cases, our blame goes
beyond merely judging that this person has done something wrong: we communicate that we
have been wronged and seek an admission of that fact. Nevertheless, Smith does concede that
arguments against her claim (i.e. arguments that reactive attitudes are necessary for blame) are
not entirely unmotivated. Given the fact that the moral protest which is necessary for blame most
commonly takes the form of such reactive attitudes, it is natural to conclude that the two are
conceptually related.35
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A further confusion results when one conflates finding blameworthy with genuine acts of
blaming. To avoid this confusion, I will emphasize the distinction between the merely evaluative
judgement that one is blameworthy and blame proper. The fact that one notices a failure to
adhere to some relevant norm, whether that norm is epistemic, moral, or generated from some
practice is not sufficient for blame. This is the mere judgement that the Strawsonian points to
when objecting to the concept of dispassionate blame. Still, such judgements coupled with moral
protest are sufficient for blame, regardless of whether such protest contains any negative reactive
attitudes.
Doxastic Blame
In discussing Strawson, Westlund, and Smith’s work, I have only considered blame in the
moral realm. Given this background, I will now consider what is unique to blame in the doxastic
realm. In doing so I hope to answer two questions: when can we blame someone for holding a
belief, and on what grounds? It seems that Smith’s account could be easily transposed from the
moral realm to the doxastic by changing the standards by which the object of one’s blame is
judged. Rather than judging that someone has done something morally wrong and protesting
their act, doxastic blame refers to the recognition and protest of someone violating an epistemic
norm. Still, this sidesteps the issue of what exactly those epistemic norms are. Moreover, why we
should be normatively blamed for our epistemic failings remains mysterious, especially if this
blame can justify reactive attitudes (outrage at someone’s belief) or even punishment.
To these ends, Conor McHugh’s analysis of the relation between truth and epistemic
norms can be instructive. In his paper “The Truth Norm of Belief” McHugh argues that it is
problematic to suggest that truth can serve as a grounding for doxastic norms. McHugh argues
that truth cannot serve as the basis for general norms governing our beliefs, e.g. “one ought to
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have true beliefs.”36 Instead, McHugh argues that truth can (and does) serve only as an
evaluative norm of beliefs. More rigorously, beliefs are good doxastic attitudes if true and bad
doxastic attitudes if false.37
Without reiterating it in full here, McHugh bases his argument for this claim on the
intuition that true beliefs are in some way correct, while false beliefs are in some way defective.
So, the belief that my sister is honest may be independently good (e.g. practically or morally),
but my holding this belief is better when it is true than when it is false. He also motivates his
conclusion by noting that it explains many other epistemic norms; we adhere to norms such as
withholding judgement when we have insufficient evidence because such norms are good means
of maximizing the true beliefs we have.
However, McHugh emphasizes that these evaluations can only apply to doxastic
attitudes: we can only be evaluated in light of the truth or falsity of our beliefs qua believer, not
simpliciter.38 So McHugh claims that in light of the truth, I can be evaluated as believing poorly
if I come to the conclusion that the northern hemisphere experiences winter in July, but this is as
far as any appropriate truth-based evaluation extends. This is especially troubling if applied to
epistemic norms generally. One could similarly agree that those who formulate beliefs by
irrational (e.g. unreliable) means should be evaluated as poor believers, but this is as far as any
appropriate evaluation extends for such agents.
In this restricted scope an important objection resurfaces: while such norms may be
universally applicable to all of us qua believer, there is no rationale for why we are required to
be good believers (e.g. given a truth norm, to have true beliefs). If none exists, only a trivial type
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of evaluative blame could exist in the doxastic realm. One could only blame someone qua
believer for having a false (or unreliably generated) belief in the same way they would blame
someone qua runner. That is, blame concerning one’s false belief would only amount to the
charge that one was not adhering to the norms of the practice.
To this objection I repeat Robert Osborne’s important insight from the previous chapter.
We are obligated to be good believers in virtue of the potential harms we could cause by being
poor epistemic agents.39 To use the above example, if I regularly run marathons for my own
enjoyment and suddenly fail to finish one because I’ve stopped training, I cannot be blamed for
running that race poorly except qua runner. But consider Pheidippides, the soldier who delivered
messages from the Battle of Marathon for which the modern race is named. If he failed to run
those extensive courses and deliver important information for the war effort, many more of his
Greek countrymen would have died in battle. So not only could Pheidippides be blamed in virtue
of being a poor runner if he collapsed one mile in, but he could also be blamed in virtue of
failing his obligations as a soldier. The case is quite similar for all of us as epistemic agents, as
others in our epistemic communities can be hurt, misled, and suffer losses if we fail to manage
our beliefs responsibly.
With this in mind, we can now move on to answering the question of when doxastic
blame is appropriate. If we deny McHugh’s argument and make the truth norm the basis for
doxastic blame, it may seem that all false beliefs render their believer blameworthy insofar as
they jeopardize others in the larger epistemic community. However, this claim seems
implausibly radical. An account that regards all of us as perpetually blameworthy for our beliefs
does not seem at all right. Nearly all of us hold false beliefs; if I myself could somehow empty
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the contents of my head and sort the false beliefs from the true, I’m not confident more than half
would turn up in my favor. Thus, if I am to reject the conclusion that we are all perpetually
blameworthy in virtue of having false beliefs, I must either provide expansive excusing
conditions which mitigate our blame in most cases, or modify my concept of doxastic blame to
include considerations beyond the effects one’s beliefs have on their epistemic community.
I will go with the latter approach. My reason for doing this is stated well by Peels:
excuses should not be sweeping conditions that apply to all universally and should be the
exceptional situation instead of the norm.40 Moreover, taking beliefs themselves as the grounding
of one’s blame would in an important sense miss one’s target. When we blame an agent, we do
so not simply in virtue of some negative trait or circumstance, but because we believe they have
brought about some ill through the violation of a relevant norm. 41 Thus, I will identify
blameworthy beliefs as those formed in violation of a relevant epistemic norm (without excuse).
What these norms are will be explored in the next chapter.
Nevertheless, while I still believe that epistemic harms ultimately ground doxastic blame,
such blame is not the sort of condition we can apply to all universally without considering the
context in which one develops a false belief. This is especially true since we are not always in a
position to reliably gather true beliefs, nor are we always in a position to appreciate the proper
way to devote our epistemic resources to optimize the outcome of our belief forming processes.
In order to formulate an acceptable account of doxastic blame, this context dependence must be
accounted for. In the remainder of this chapter, I will consider such context dependence.
Degrees of Doxastic Blame
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I will first argue that how blameworthy one is for a particular belief is determined largely
by just how significant that belief is and how dangerous holding it is to one’s epistemic
community. I think this flows naturally from Osborne’s claim that doxastic responsibility is
ultimately grounded in the potential for harms in one’s epistemic community, and also echoes
my claim of variable responsibility from the previous chapter. Briefly restated, my argument for
variable responsibility is as follows: if epistemic harms ground our normative evaluations of
someone’s beliefs, surely the development of more consequential beliefs deserve more intense
judgements. The case is no different for doxastic blame.
Some examples can help further this point. Imagine that I believe that the medulla
oblongata is situated immediately behind the right eye socket. This belief is clearly false, but in
my daily life I am fairly unlikely to cause significant harm by forming it. I might not find anyone
who cares enough about neural anatomy to accept my false belief without verification, nor am I
likely to perform brain surgery anytime soon. However, if a practicing neurosurgeon were to
adopt this belief, they would be extremely blameworthy simply for forming and maintaining that
belief in virtue of their profession; they could perhaps communicate it to surgeons in training or
perform malpractice as a result. With this example I hope to have demonstrated that with the
formation of the same belief, the appropriate amount of blame can shift wildly depending upon
the position one is in to cause harm based upon that belief. 42
A potential objection to this claim is that the above example the additional blame is
entirely a product of the professional role the neurosurgeon occupies. Instead, an account of
doxastic blame should rely only on desiderata that apply universally and address us purely as
believers. In replying to such an objection, I would first argue that no such account can track
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well with our actual practice of doxastic blame. We are all required to develop particular true
beliefs based upon very individual considerations; if doxastic blame serves to regulate this
practice any reliable account will track with this variation. I would also argue that such examples
of varying doxastic blame are not restricted to the professional realm. We can be blamed for
many beliefs simply as believers, and we assign different levels of blame to these beliefs
depending on their potential for causing harm.
One might also object by arguing that this sort of blame completely flouts McHugh’s
conclusion (which I endorsed above) that truth norms cannot ground practices of doxastic blame.
However, doxastic blame of the sort above is not justified exclusively in light of a truth norm.
Norms governing professional conduct and our roles as epistemic agents in a larger community
are the primary basis for doxastic blame directed at such failings. It is not in virtue of the fact
that myself or the neurosurgeon develop this false belief that we are blameworthy. It is in virtue
of the fact that it could be reasonably demanded of either of us to take steps to prevent the
acquisition or maintenance of such a belief. Such demands are themselves made reasonable by
the harm this belief could cause in our epistemic community. However, the potential for harm in
the case of the neurosurgeon is orders of magnitude higher than that of myself or any layperson.
The doxastic blame appropriately attributable to her for this epistemic failing is much higher as a
result.
I should note that in the above example my relative inability to harm others with my false
belief in the location of the medulla oblongata does not eliminate my blameworthiness, it only
minimizes it. However, I would argue that for some beliefs, doxastic blame can be entirely
eliminated by the relative inability to produce epistemic harms. I imagine Chase Wren’s
examples of useless beliefs, such as the belief that the number of blades of grass on the
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Whitehouse lawn is even.43 Even if we knew for a fact that that belief was false, it seems
ludicrous to imagine myself being blamed for it in some nightmarish scenario where the death of
several orphans results from my false belief.
One might argue to the contrary that some minimal blame does persist in such instances. I
would respond that it is important to keep in mind that we are extremely limited as epistemic
agents; we have limited time and resources to devote to the management of our beliefs. Perhaps
if omniscience were humanly obtainable, I would be obligated to acquire a true belief about the
number of blades of grass on the Whitehouse lawn to prevent any potential nightmare orphan
scenarios. But as it stands, figuring out the truth of that useless (and soon to change) fact is not a
good use of my epistemic resources. If I am only concerned with limiting the harms I impose on
my epistemic community, that end would be better served by improving my beliefs regarding the
most impactful facts first, so as to most effectively use my limited epistemic resources. If such a
prescription has force, I should be blamed if I waste my time pursuing a true belief regarding the
Whitehouse lawn.44 In doing so I unwisely spend my epistemic resources and end up with more
poorly managed beliefs than I otherwise might have, which puts my epistemic community at
increased risk of harms.
The second factor I see as influencing the appropriate amount of blame that can be
assigned to a belief is the degree of control that one has over a belief. In the previous chapter I
expressly denied that control is necessary for doxastic responsibility. However, the case is not
the same for doxastic blame, as the above discussion should make clear. Recall that I have
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characterized doxastic blame along the lines of Smith’s “moral protest account”: in blaming, one
judges that someone is blameworthy, and engages in some form of protest against their
blameworthy act. On this account, I believe that blame directed at an act outside of an object’s
control is incoherent.
Lindsay Rettler articulates what generates this requirement for control well. Rettler
conceives of blame as a demand that someone acknowledge they have failed to adhere to a norm;
she notes that by being a demand of this sort blame extends beyond the merely evaluative
judgement that one has failed in the fulfillment of that norm. 45 Given my endorsement of Smith’s
“moral protest” account, Rettler and I disagree on the specific attitudes required for blame. Still,
I do not think that Rettler’s “demand for acknowledgement” and Smith’s “moral protest” differ
on this point of control.46 Whether blaming consists in protesting the actions of the blamed or
demanding an acknowledgement of their failure to adhere to a norm, blaming when one’s target
had not control over their action is incoherent. In either case, there must be something the
believer could have done in principle to avoid acting in a blameworthy way. Doxastic blame
cannot therefore extend to beliefs over which we exercise no control.
To place these concepts in a doxastic context, consider Angela Smith’s example of Bert
and Abigail, who both have equally reprehensible racist beliefs. While Abigail was born into a
community that imposed such beliefs upon her, Bert developed his racist beliefs coming from a
family that encouraged more tolerant and egalitarian attitudes. 47 Smith uses this example to
emphasize the point that both Bert and Abigail are equally responsible for their racist attitudes.
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Given the arguments I presented in the previous chapter, I hope I have made it clear that I agree
with Smith on this point.
Interestingly though, Smith notes that these cases demand different degrees of criticism. 48
This seems to align well with intuition, as we often take into account the epistemic habits of a
believer before we blame them for any flawed belief. The case of Bert and Abigail thus supports
the relationship between doxastic blame and control I have offered above. Abigail is still
blameworthy for her beliefs, as it was not in principle impossible for her to seek out and acquire
more tolerant views. However, Bert is much more blameworthy for the same beliefs, as he had to
actively fight against the current of his sympathetic upbringing to end up with the pernicious
beliefs he has. In just the same way, we wouldn’t regard someone who read half a Wikipedia
page on cholera as equally blameworthy as someone who checked with experts and consulted
multiple sources, even if they both ended up with the same false belief that cholera is caused by a
virus; no less would we be lenient with someone who swung a golf club in a lightning storm.
Thus, I hope to have demonstrated in this chapter that while factors such as potential
harms or control have no effect on whether an agent is responsible for a belief, they do impact
the degree and type of blame that is appropriate to attribute to that agent for having that belief.
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3. Responsible Belief
Having characterized doxastic blame and the conditions which mitigate it, I will now
argue for an account of responsible belief as blameless belief. In doing so I will build on
arguments advanced by Rik Peels. While I agree with Peels that responsible belief is blameless
belief, I will note several key areas of emphasis on which our accounts diverge. Accordingly, I
will begin this chapter with a defense of responsible belief as blameless belief rather than
praiseworthy belief. Once I have defended this view, I will then apply my analysis of doxastic
blame to demonstrate the differences my concept of blameless belief has with that of Peels. I will
then conclude by summarizing and restating what criteria I argue are necessary for blameless
belief.
Responsible Belief as Blameless Belief
Before I consider arguments for characterizations of responsible belief, I will first make
one terminological clarification. In the first chapter of this work, I considered the conditions
required for doxastic responsibility. Questions of doxastic responsibility consider when it is
appropriate to normatively evaluate someone for their beliefs. Doxastic responsibility should not
be confused with the concepts of responsible belief or responsible believers which I will consider
in this chapter. When I call a belief or believer responsible, I do not mean to refer to the
appropriateness of normative evaluations of either (except perhaps indirectly). Instead, I refer to
the evaluation we give to either when we approve of them in a specific way. I call a believer
responsible in the same way we would call a ship captain responsible if she manages to safely
navigate her ship, and we would call an accountant responsible if she thoroughly avoided clerical
errors.
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In order to characterize responsible belief, I will use the same normative terms that I have
referenced throughout this work, namely praise, blame, and neutral appraisal. If one takes this
approach, it seems there are only two possible analyses of responsible belief: one could require
that responsible belief be either praiseworthy or blameless. These competing theses seem both
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. 49 I prefer the latter account of responsible belief
as blameless belief and will support this preference using arguments provided by Peels.
My defense will benefit greatly by beginning with a more rigorous characterization of
these two theses. We can regard one as holding a belief praiseworthily if they are appropriately
liable to positive evaluation for holding that belief. Likewise, one holds a belief blamelessly if
one is immune to negative evaluation for holding that belief. It follows from these definitions
that all praiseworthy belief must also be blameless, as one cannot simultaneously be evaluated
positively and negatively for holding the same belief. 50 Thus, we can see that these two camps
both agree that all praiseworthy belief is responsible; their contention concerns only those
neutrally appraised beliefs which deserve neither praise nor blame.
To defend the claim that responsible belief is blameless rather than praiseworthy, Peels
offers several considerations meant to demonstrate the explanatory superiority of the former.
Peels first suggests that our evaluation of agents should be analogous in both moral and
epistemic contexts.51 In order to call someone responsible in the moral realm, we do not require
that they perform any praiseworthy actions; it seems instead that to be morally responsible, one
needs only avoid violating any ethical norms. 52 To give an example, we can call a forester
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responsible if he manages his woodlands such that they remain in the same condition throughout
his stewardship.53 Performing praiseworthy actions such as expanding and improving the woods
are not required for his responsibility, while blameworthy actions such as overharvesting
suspend it.
Peels uses epistemic examples as well to show that praiseworthiness is too high a
standard for responsible belief. One such example is skepticism about the external world: most
everyone believes in some external world, but it does not seem right to call anyone praiseworthy
for doing so. Belief in the external world would therefore be considered irresponsible if
responsible belief must be praiseworthy. 54 I will further emphasize that such examples can be
extended to much more mundane matters than skepticism. It seems that praiseworthy belief is
somewhat rare, and even more so is an agent who can achieve it consistently. It would not be
right to call the vast number of beliefs which we hold inescapably praiseworthy; should we
require such praiseworthiness for responsibility, it would seem that we all hold a great deal of
beliefs irresponsibly. Take for example the belief that I in fact have a brain which deals with all
of my sensory input and information processing. It seems bizarre to consider me praiseworthy
for holding this belief (and countless others like it), and equally absurd to call me irresponsible
for holding it.
Thus, I consider the analysis of responsible belief as blameless belief decidedly
preferable to those requiring praiseworthiness. While Peels goes on to refute arguments against
responsible belief as blameless belief, thorough advocacy for responsible belief as blameless
belief is neither the primary goal of this work nor necessary to my project. Accordingly, I will
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further develop my account of responsible belief with the (hopefully well supported) assumption
that blamelessness is sufficient for it.
Our Doxastic Obligations
Having concluded that responsible belief is blameless belief, I will now continue to lay
out my characterization of blameless belief itself. In the previous chapter I identified doxastic
blame with the violation of doxastic norms without excuse. Accordingly, in the remainder of this
chapter I will consider which doxastic norms we are obligated to adhere to, and what conditions
excuse us for their violation. I will begin with a summary of Rik Peels’ account of our doxastic
obligations and contrast it with my own. In doing so, I hope to refine Peels’ account through
emphasis on the interpersonal doxastic obligations I have heavily emphasized throughout this
work.
Peels develops his account of responsible belief in terms of “intellectual obligations.” 55
While I have described Peel’s analysis of such obligations elsewhere, I will begin by more
thoroughly describing them here. Peels argues that we have an intellectual obligation to perform
some action or series of actions when the failure to do so will lead us to acquire beliefs that are in
some way bad.56 It is important to note that these intellectual obligations are all-thingsconsidered obligations.57 That is, one cannot be blamed for violating an intellectual obligation
when doing so was necessary to prevent acquiring an even worse belief; we are only doxastically
obligated to do what we should all things considered.58
Peels further develops this initial definition of intellectual obligations with a few key
distinctions. The first of these is the distinction between objective badness and subjective
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badness. On Peels’ account, we have objective intellectual obligations to perform those actions
that would in actuality prevent us from acquiring bad beliefs, and subjective intellectual
obligations to perform those actions which we mistakenly think would prevent us from acquiring
bad beliefs.59 So even if my acquiring the false belief that my desk is made of marble is not
objectively bad by any measure, if I think it is in some way bad I still have a subjective
obligation to correct it. Peels also distinguishes contingent and non-contingent intellectual
obligations. We have intellectual obligations contingently which derive from the specific roles
and professions we occupy, while non-contingent intellectual obligations apply to all doxastic
agents.60
While Peels lingers on these points and develops them with a great deal of rigor, the
condensed summary I have made so far should be sufficient for the purposes of this work.
Already, it should be fairly easy to note a divergence in grounding between my account and
Peels’. Recall that in the prior chapter I emphasized the fact that the epistemic harms which
result from our beliefs are the ultimate grounding for doxastic blame. For this reason, I do not
take epistemic fault itself to be the primary justification for doxastic blame: while one’s belief
may be epistemically or practically bad, the pro tanto obligations generated by these
considerations are always defeated by any competing moral obligation to minimize the harms
one causes.
To argue for and clarify this claim I will point once more to Chase Wren’s examples of
pointless truths (originally coined by Johnathan Kvanvig). 61 Such examples provide a useful
heuristic, because they allow us to observe our intuitions about epistemic problems isolated from

59

Peels, 97.
Peels, 101.
61
Chase Wren, “Truth is Not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98, (2017): 111.
60

Conk 38
any moral or practical considerations. This is important because often we value knowing the
truth of the propositions for primarily instrumental reasons- for most engineers knowing
Newtonian mechanics is useful only insofar as it aids in bridge construction, for example. 62
Examining the value of true propositions divorced from such instrumental gains thus allows us to
more clearly see their worth compared to similar moral stakes.
Take as an example the proposition that the number of grains of sand on the western
coast of South Africa is a multiple of three. I would not be any morally better or worse off
simply for knowing the truth value of this proposition, but I would be minimally better off
epistemically. If we ask ourselves how much moral cost we are willing to incur in order to secure
such epistemic gains, I think such examples make clear that the answer is none. In such cases,
even the smallest moral cost (e.g. a pinprick given to a total stranger) seems unjustified when the
only gain is knowing the truth of a proposition for its own sake: we simply do not care enough
about such propositions to harm someone. I regard the case as the same for any other purely
epistemic obligation, no matter how epistemically significant.
Accordingly, while I will not argue that we have no epistemic obligations whatsoever, for
our all-things-considered obligation to align with our epistemic obligation the all-thingsconsidered obligation must either be completely non-moral or align with some moral
obligation.63 Put differently, any epistemic obligation at odds with a moral obligation will be
defeated by it. It is also important to note that such purely epistemic scenarios are quite rare in
any real circumstances; as I pointed out in the last chapter, how we use our epistemic resources
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and which true and false beliefs we have can make a huge difference to our moral standing. It
would thus be quite difficult to divorce these seemingly distinct realms and arrive at a purely
epistemic obligation. So, when considering the badness of our beliefs and its impact on our
obligations, I place our moral obligations at the forefront.
To give a more concrete example to illustrate these concepts, assume I simultaneously
believe all of the propositions in the following inconsistent triad.
(1) If ducks are not around in late winter, they must migrate elsewhere.
(2) Ducks are not around in late winter.
(3) Ducks are not capable of long distance migration.
If we stipulate that I have an epistemic obligation to believe rationally, then continuing to
believe all of these propositions would violate such an obligation and I would be required to
revise my beliefs. While this epistemic obligation persists, I argue that I also have a moral
obligation to my epistemic community to revise my beliefs. Again, this is grounded in the
potential harm I might cause by continuing to hold such beliefs (e.g. by misleading children or
wasting someone’s time when they explain to me why I am wrong). I argue that this moral
obligation provides a much stronger reason I ought to revise my beliefs than my purely epistemic
duty to believe rationally.
This characterization of the interplay between our moral and epistemic obligations has
important implications for my analysis of responsible belief. It also marks a significant departure
my account will have from Peels’ view. According to Peels, we have two main types of
obligations grounded in epistemic badness: the first arises when we believe that the failure to
perform some action will lead to the future acquisition of epistemically bad beliefs (such badness
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is subjective).64 The latter type arises in cases of doxastic discrepancy, in which we recognize
something epistemically bad about our beliefs. Doxastic discrepancy generates an objective
obligation to eliminate the discrepancy, and a subjective obligation to perform an action which
one thinks will eliminate the discrepancy.65
Given what I have argued above about the import of moral obligations, I find this
characterization to be so limited that it becomes irrelevant. This irrelevance stems from the fact
that such moral obligations are ubiquitous in our everyday doxastic practice. Recall that I believe
moral obligations always defeat any countervailing epistemic obligation. Since in almost all the
instances where we have an epistemic obligation there is a concurrent moral obligation, our allthings-considered obligation is always aligned with what is morally demanded of us. I take these
moral obligations to be objective (that is, they remains in some capacity whether or not the
believer recognizes them as an obligation). 66 Since the extreme majority of our intellectual
obligations are thus objective, I take Peels’ distinction between objective and subjective
obligations to be practically irrelevant.
Even if all of this seems correct, it may not yet be clear why it runs contrary to Peels’
account. I argue that if the scope of our purely epistemic obligations is as restricted as I suspect,
then the extent of our would-be intellectual obligations is much greater than Peels suggests in his
account. Consequently, I argue that nearly all of our doxastic activities have a corresponding
objective moral obligation owing to the potential harms bad beliefs could produce. While this
may not run directly contrary to Peels’ account (in fact, I think one could fit it in his framework
without modification), it certainly aggravates a fear Peels had.
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Recall that Peels limits the scope of our objective epistemic obligations to cases of
doxastic discrepancy. He motivates this constraint at least in part with the fact that our having an
obligation in all cases of epistemically bad belief would result in practically infinite number of
intellectual obligations which we routinely violate. 67 Without such restrictions on this class of
objective epistemic obligations, every epistemically flawed belief we hold would represent a
violation of our intellectual obligations. Considering all the beliefs we have which rest on faulty
logic, a lack of evidence, and poor quality evidence, we would all routinely violate a staggering
number of our intellectual obligations every day if these objective obligations were binding.
Peels thinks that this is an unacceptable outcome for any realistic account of responsible belief. If
my emphasis on the potential harms of beliefs commits me to an equally large number of
doxastic obligations, how can I square my account with the multitude of obligations such harms
would create?
I offer two considerations to mitigate such worries. I first reiterate that I do believe there
are excusing conditions which limit the extent of doxastic blame. I will lay these out later in this
chapter. The second is articulated well by Scott Stapleford in dealing with a similar issue which
he calls “the justificational fecundity of evidence.” Stapleford recognizes that all the sensory data
we receive and propositions we already believe justify a practically infinite number of further
beliefs equally well.68 So, if we have any duties to manage our beliefs at all (Stapleford argues
that we do) it will be impossible to fulfill these duties perfectly. 69 Accordingly, Stapleford
compares our epistemic duties to Kantian imperfect moral duties. Imperfect duties are
distinguished as general guiding principles which seek to satisfy some general end rather than
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inviolable maxims we are required to uphold. 70 When and how these duties are fulfilled requires
our judgement, and there is no upper limit to their fulfillment.
A characterization of our doxastic (or in Peels’ terminology, intellectual) obligations as
imperfect duties is indispensable to our understanding of them, especially in the interpersonal
context I have emphasized here. Nor is it unmotivated: no matter which metric one chooses as
the base of our doxastic duties, there is no means available to us by which we can be perfect
believers. It is impossible for us to establish a fully internally consistent doxastic framework,
perfectly proportion our beliefs to our evidence, cultivate infallible intellectual virtues, etc. It is
also impossible to spend all of our time examining the sum total of our beliefs to correct any
errors we might have internally, or to seek out enough evidence to root out all of our false
beliefs. When and how we seek to revise our beliefs requires us to develop sharp judgement in
determining the best use of our epistemic resources. Thus any account based on perfect doxastic
duties will be left wanting or will have to provide quite broad excusing conditions. Apart from
these differences in grounding and the characterization of our doxastic obligations as imperfect
duties, I can accept Peels’ account of doxastic obligations without much modification.
Excused Blameworthy Belief
Regarding excuses, Peels suggests two major categories which can mitigate or eliminate
the blame appropriate to one’s violation of an intellectual obligation. The first of these is force; if
one is compelled to violate an intellectual obligation, then they are excused from blame for doing
so.71 The second category of excuse Peels offers is ignorance. Peels suggests that ignorance can
provide a partial or full excuse for the violation of one’s intellectual obligations in several
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instances. One can be ignorant of their intellectual obligation, their ability to fulfill it, or the fact
that one of their actions will lead to the violation of intellectual obligations in the future. 72
I agree that blameworthy beliefs acquired as the result of compulsion should be excused.
I find Peels’ account of ignorance as an excuse for the violation of intellectual obligations
acceptable as well, but again feel it would benefit from increased emphasis on blameworthy
ignorance. While Peels does acknowledge that ignorance itself can be blameworthy, I worry that
he fails to properly emphasize and develop this point. 73 Accordingly, I will elaborate on which
cases of ignorance are blameworthy below.
To organize this discussion, I begin with a reminder of Peels’ distinction between
contingent and non-contingent obligations. Recall that these point respectively to the obligations
we have as the result of the roles or professions that we occupy and the obligations attributable to
all believers. Sandford Goldberg provides an excellent account of when ignorance can be
blameworthy and thus fails to excuse for each of these types of obligations. 74 Goldberg argues
that when it can be legitimately expected of one based upon some role they fill that they are
aware of x, their ignorance of x is itself blameworthy.75 While “some role they fill” may at first
glance seem to point exclusively to professional or institutional roles, it is important to note that
Goldberg extends his argument to those expectations which are appropriate to all as mature
epistemic and moral agents.76
An example of such expectations is the assumption that one (if they belong to a
community of mostly literate agents) read carefully. To illustrate why this extends beyond the
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occupational or institutional roles we fill, imagine that a legal associate skips over several lines
when editing an appellate brief. While they have certainly failed in their professional duty, they
need not be an attorney to have this expectation legitimately thrust upon them; Goldberg argues
that this and other similar expectations generate obligations upon us simply as mature epistemic
agents, and not in virtue of any other roles we occupy.77
Thus ignorance can fail to excuse both our contingent and non-contingent obligations. 78 I
will not go into detail as to what expectations can be legitimately imposed upon us either as
believers or as a result of the specific roles we occupy. Such expectations are far too individual
and context dependent to be articulated with any degree of rigor. However, I will emphasize that
such blameworthy ignorance covers many of the cases we encounter in daily life; it is quite a
rare circumstance that one should be ignorant while not violating any of their contingent or noncontingent obligations.
Responsible Belief as Harm Reduction
I will now summarize this chapter with a collected restatement of my account of
responsible belief. I have argued above that responsible belief is blameless belief. I have also
noted that practically all of our doxastic obligations are imposed upon us in virtue of their moral
force; we are thus blameworthy as believers when our beliefs put someone in our epistemic
community in harm’s way. Given the practically infinite number of beliefs we have which may
create such harms, our obligations to minimize them are best characterized as imperfect duties:
there is no upper limit to how well we can satisfy these obligations, and when and how we do is
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a matter of judgement. There are also two major circumstances which mitigate the blame we are
subject to for beliefs which generate harms.
Recall that in the last chapter, I distinguished between the mere judgement that one is
blameworthy and blaming proper. Importantly, I concluded that blaming proper is only
appropriate when the target of one’s blame could have avoided acting blameworthily. This
condition is generative of the two categories of excuse which I have noted above, excuses which
make blame inappropriate.79 One is not susceptible to blame if they developed their belief out of
compulsion or ignorance, where their ignorance is not itself blameworthy. Ignorance is
blameworthy when it could be reasonably expected of that believer to have performed actions to
address their ignorance, whether or not they knew that such courses of action were available to
them or that they had a duty to correct their ignorance.
Therefore, one holds a belief responsibly when they fail to generate harms in their
epistemic community by holding that belief or are excused for doing so. Now that I have
specified what makes individual beliefs responsible, in the next chapter I will continue to derive
from this principle the long term characteristics which make believers responsible as doxastic
agents: what course of action is advisable to us as believers in order to globally minimize the
harms we impose on our epistemic community as the result of our beliefs?
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4. Doxastic Virtue
In the previous chapter, I provided an account of responsible belief as blameless belief
and continued to characterize the doxastic obligations to which we are bound. In doing so, I
found Rik Peels’ accounts of each quite tenable, though argued that some points (mainly
regarding the extent of our doxastic obligations and excusing conditions for them) were in need
of emphasis and reframing. Throughout this work, I have emphasized that one of the most
valuable insights an account of responsible belief can provide is guidance for believers. Given
this importance, I now want to apply my characterization of faulty beliefs to this end. That is, I
want to consider how we can best navigate our doxastic lives to reduce the number of faulty
beliefs for which we are blameworthy.
In this chapter I will use the conclusions I have arrived at concerning doxastic obligations
and blame to argue for a particular characterization of responsible believers. I argue that if
responsible belief is blameless belief, responsible believers are those who act in a way such that
their blameworthy beliefs are minimized. To this end, my primary aim is to provide an account
of the qualities which minimize the blame one might be subject to as a believer. In doing so, I
will draw primarily from prior accounts offered by Rik Peels and James Montmarquet. Peels’
work on excusing conditions for doxastic blame provides a motivation for my account, and
Montmarquet’s work on epistemic virtue provides its content.
Based upon the conclusions Peels reaches in this argument, I will argue that the proper
approach to believing well is the cultivation of doxastic virtue. I will ultimately conclude that
Montmarquet’s virtue of epistemic conscientiousness is the most critical quality for responsible
belief. I will also expand upon his concept of epistemic conscientiousness to better account for
the interpersonal dimension of belief I have emphasized throughout this work. Finally, I will
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contrast this approach with alternative accounts which prefer the revision of one’s current beliefs
through reflection or different epistemic virtues and defend my preference for Montmarquet’s
approach.
Blameless Ignorance and the Regress Problem
In this section I will lay out an objection Peels notes to his account of blameless
ignorance and his response to this objection. The objection is centered on Peels’ claim that
ignorance is only blameworthy in cases where one could have prevented their ignorance by
meeting their intellectual obligation to do so.80 Peels notes that others such as Montmarquet,
Michael Zimmerman, and William Fitzpatrick have voiced concerns that such a claim leads to an
infinite regress of blamelessness.
The issue arises when one considers that to be blameworthy for ignorance on Peels’
account, their blame must result from a past action which caused the ignorance. 81 However, the
same could be equally well said of those past actions themselves: the action(s) which caused
one’s ignorance were performed in ignorance, so there must be some even more distant past
action in virtue of which this past ignorance is blameworthy. 82 Such explanations lead quickly to
an infinite regress, with no terminal blameworthy action to break the cycle. Take as an example
my ignorance that I was meant to provide feedback on a friend’s paper draft. If I am
blameworthy for this ignorance, I could point to a past action where I failed to exercise due
cognizance of my obligation which would have prevented my ignorance (e.g. setting a reminder
or writing myself a note). However, to avoid blame for my failure to write myself a note or set a
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reminder, I could just as easily point to my ignorance that such cognizance was required of me.
From there, the regress continues indefinitely.
The only means of breaking such a cycle are cases of akrasia, where one clearly
recognizes their intellectual obligation and decides to violate it anyway. 83 However, Peels notes
that objectors maintain that akrasia is quite rare relative to how prevalent blameworthy
ignorance is. Differently put, there are not enough cases of akrasia to account for all the
blameworthy ignorance we perceive. Thus we are left on the horns of a dilemma, wanting neither
to limit the cases of blameworthy ignorance to such rare cases of akrasia or to tolerate the
infinite chains of blamelessness noted above. 84
Peels responds to this argument by claiming that cases of akrasia in the doxastic realm
are neither as limited nor as impotent as the objectors suppose. He begins his response by
demonstrating that cases of akrasia compound in a way that makes them a viable solution to
these chains of ignorance. If we suppose that akrasia is responsible for only five out of every
hundred blameworthy acts, we need only go back 15 actions before it is more likely than not that
one is blameworthy for their act due to akrasia than ignorance.85 This fifteen act chain may
provide quite a distant grounding for one’s blame, but it is not infinitely far away as the objectors
suggest.
Peels also suggests that akrasia is much more prevalent in the doxastic realm than
intuition initially suggests. His suggestion is grounded in the claim that epistemic akrasia is
importantly different from the moral akrasia on which we base our intuitions. He motivates this
claim by pointing out that while in most instances we have a clear indication of the consequences

83

Ibid.
Peels, 190.
85
Peels, 192.
84

Conk 50
of our moral failings, the consequences of those in the epistemic realm are more obscure: we are
much less likely to foresee the particular beliefs we will acquire when we violate an epistemic
obligation, as well as the greater moral and practical consequences that will result. 86
To give an example, imagine a man called Alonso ignores evidence in an attempt to
maintain a belief that is dear to him, knowing that his behavior is epistemically unsound. In such
cases it seems extremely difficult to predict the consequences of such epistemically bad
behavior. His unsupported belief may lead him to mislead others, to fail to fulfill certain
obligations he has, or nothing may come of it at all. Contrast this with the case of Alfonso (who
happens to be a high ranking bureaucrat) taking a bribe from an oil executive wanting to evade
environmental regulations. The consequences of Alfonso’s akratic bribe taking are much more
clear: likely some environmental damage will result, respect for the regulations will diminish,
and future corruption may be provoked by the success of the oil tycoon’s attempt. While in the
case of the bribe the consequences are not easy to ignore, the ambiguous consequences of
Alonso’s epistemic failings makes them much easier for him to commit even when he knows that
they are epistemically flawed.
Finally, Peels also describes dormant and tacit beliefs as a possible source of
blameworthy belief. Roughly, one holds a belief that p dormantly whenever one does not at the
moment actively consider that p, but has in the past believed the p and not changed their mind
since.87 One holds a belief that p tacitly whenever one has never considered that p, but would
when prompted believe that p. Peels argues that one can be blameworthy for not acting on a
dormant or tacit belief.
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Imagine for example that I dormantly believe my garbage disposal is full of silverware. 88
If I fail to inform my roommate that the garbage disposal is full of silverware while I watch them
reach to turn it on, I am blameworthy even though I am neither ignorant nor acting from
akrasia.89 It is much more accurate to describe this as a case of epistemic carelessness, or
blameworthy failure to act upon a dormant or tacit belief.
I have laid out Peels’ response to this argument not primarily because I was troubled by
the objection itself, but because his response provides a clear summary for what he takes to be
the most common (if not an exhaustive list of) instances of blameworthy belief. It is particularly
helpful because it synthesizes his accounts of intellectual obligations and excusing conditions
into a single focus. One is blameworthy without excuse for a belief when one acts from this sort
of epistemic akrasia or carelessly fails to act on a dormant or tacit belief.
While not critical for the purposes of this work, it may be of interest to consider whether
or not on Peels’ account doxastic blameworthiness is conceptually limited to these two cases.
Given how thoroughly Peels develops these points, I suspect the relationship is indeed one of
necessity, especially in the epistemic realm. Recall that Peels essentially limits our epistemic
intellectual obligations to those that are subjective, i.e. those we recognize as epistemically bad. 90
This would seem to make akrasia or carelessness a necessary condition for epistemic
blameworthiness, as on Peels’ account we must recognize our epistemic shortcomings to have an
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intellectual obligation to correct them. We must then violate them knowingly, which is only
possible if we act out of akrasia.
In the moral realm, things are less clear cut. Unlike the epistemic cases noted above,
Peels acknowledges that we can have intellectual obligations in virtue of objective moral
badness. Could we violate these by means other than akrasia or carelessness? I think that for
Peels the answer remains “no”. Even if intellectual obligations exist in such cases, violations of
them will either result from the believer knowingly violating them (which would amount to
akrasia) or violating them out of ignorance. Cases where one violates a moral intellectual
obligation out of ignorance will generally be fully excused. 91 The remaining cases where one is
blameworthily ignorant are traced back to cases of akrasia or carelessness, as in the argument
above.
Responsible Believers and Epistemic Virtue
Regardless of whether or not the above argument establishes the necessary limitation of
doxastic blame to cases of akrasia or carelessness, it at least motivates the claim that these two
categories account for the vast majority of unexcused doxastic blame: this is the premise on
which the remainder of this chapter will turn. I argue that if all or most of our doxastic failings
stem from these sorts of doxastic akrasia or carelessness, responsible believers are best
characterized as those who have attained the epistemic virtue which minimizes these failings.
To motivate this claim, we must first investigate what such cases of such doxastic failings
look like. I take acts like wishful thinking as a paradigmatic example of doxastic akrasia; when
we think wishfully (and are aware of doing so), we recognize that we are not epistemically
justified in believing that p but do so regardless. If I choose to believe that I am morally flawless
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despite having clear evidence to the contrary simply because it improves my self-image, I am
acting out of doxastic akrasia. Other acts in this category might include biased evidence
gathering practices and closed mindedness.
With this picture of doxastic failure in mind, it should be clear that the common thread
uniting cases of such failure is insufficient attention to what is epistemically demanded of the
believer. In cases of wishful thinking, flawed evidence gathering, and closed mindedness, the
believer inappropriately subjugates these epistemic demands to some other purpose- their pride,
discomfort, etc. In cases of carelessness, one simply fails to sufficiently regard the demands
imposed upon them (out of laziness, inattention, or disregard). Thus, in all cases a blameworthy
believer fails to appropriately act upon these demands.
This diagnosis provides a strong justification for my claim that epistemic virtue is critical
for responsible belief. In all of the above cases, doxastic failure results from some lack of
epistemic fortitude: one fails to accurately appraise and respond to the stakes of their epistemic
actions and generates some harm as a result. 92 Given this conclusion, I point to the cultivation of
epistemic virtue as the proper means of combatting such failure. Many epistemic virtues have
been spelled out and advocated for in prior works, including open-mindedness, intellectual
courage, introspection, or clear-sightedness. 93 However, not all of these are relevant to
characterizing responsible believers, as not all limit cases of doxastic blame. This is why I
indicate Montmarquet’s virtue of epistemic conscientiousness as solely important to responsible
belief.
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In his account, Montmarquet echoes many of the same points I have highlighted above:
doxastic failure is ultimately rooted in a failure to act with due care epistemically. 94 This lack of
care manifests as insufficient regard for the truth in one’s epistemic actions. By “epistemic
actions” I mean those actions which have a significant relation to our belief forming processes,
including introspection, evidence gathering, reflection, etc. The disregard to which Montmarquet
points is the result of one’s priority of their own interests over truth in such actions. 95
Montmarquet offers the virtue of epistemic conscientiousness as the antidote to such
failure. Epistemic conscientiousness consists in an “underlying desire to believe what is true and
to avoid belief in what is false.”96 This initial definition may seem unhelpful, as it should be an
obvious goal for anybody looking to believe well. Noting this, Montmarquet further explains that
conscientiousness consists in developing this desire for truth such that it cannot be defeated by
other influences.97 Care is the lifeblood of this virtue; one can only become epistemically
conscientious by exerting an effort to do so, and a certain amount of this effort is required of
us.98
While I agree with Montmarquet on all of these points, I want to develop his concept of
epistemic conscientiousness to better account for interpersonal contexts of belief. I argue that an
important component of epistemic conscientiousness is a cognizance of the greater outcomes of
one’s epistemic actions. As I noted in the previous chapter, we are extremely limited in the
resources (time, effort, etc.) that we are capable of committing to our epistemic dealings.
Accordingly, while I feel that Montmarquet adequately identifies a lack of care as a failure to be
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epistemically conscientious, here I will note mismanaged care as an additional failure. That is to
say, I argue that exerting as much effort as could be reasonably demanded of one in their
epistemic dealings is not sufficient for epistemic conscientiousness. I argue that we are
additionally required to competently manage the ways in which we direct such efforts.
To illustrate this point, recall my discussion of Chase Wren’s useless truths. I noted in
chapter two that it would be inadvisable for one to pursue the truth of the matter concerning the
number of blades of grass on the Whitehouse lawn. I think it is clear that such an endeavor is a
waste of one’s epistemic resources, and I have accordingly argued that one might be
blameworthy for pursuing such an endeavor. Even if one applied more care than anyone could
reasonably demand of them in the narrow pursuit of such truths, I do not think we would call
them epistemically conscientious.
However, I will further argue here that such blame extends beyond these clear-cut cases.
To this end, I argue that a necessary component of epistemic conscientiousness is sufficient
cognizance of one’s epistemic duties and the greater consequences of one’s epistemic actions.
Much of this will be individualized and derive from the roles one occupies. It would be
epistemically conscientious for example for a father to develop a thorough understanding of his
child’s character, personality, and tastes. It would be epistemically careless for him to do so
about a total stranger with whom he is certain he will never interact.
Despite the ubiquity of such role-generated demands, our exercise of epistemic
conscientiousness is not exhausted by cognizance of them alone. In illustrating this claim, again I
point to the claim made by Sanford Goldberg when discussing his “should have known”
phenomena. While many of our epistemic obligations are generated by the roles we occupy,

Conk 56
there are still obligations that apply universally to us all as epistemic agents. 99 In the same vein, I
argue that we have a corresponding obligation to judiciously allocate our epistemic resources in
attending to such obligations. “Judicious” management requires that one recognize the needs of
their epistemic community and their position in it. Doing so will allow them to know which
epistemic virtues and specific true beliefs are demanded of them (and perhaps more importantly
which can be safely disregarded), and accordingly how to meet those demands.
I will note once more that our ability to meet these demands is inherently imperfect. As in
the last chapter, I argue that these obligations are best conceived of as imperfect duties to which
we owe some unspecified degree of attention. This aligns well with Montmarquet’s account, as
he notes only that “a certain level of effort may rightly be expected of one.” 100 Likewise, I will
conclude with the modified observation that a certain level of effort applied with a certain level
of judgement may be rightly expected of one. When one applies a sufficient amount of each, they
are epistemically conscientious. Thus, care towards the truth directed by a keen sense of what is
demanded of one epistemically are the marks of responsible believers.
The Advantage of a Virtue-Theoretic Account
I want to indicate explicitly that this virtue-theoretic account is directly motivated by the
observations made by Peels in the above section: we are blameworthy for beliefs which result
either from akrasia or carelessness.101 However, given my definition of responsible believers as
those who minimize the doxastic blame attributable to them one might argue that there are better
means of achieving this end than developing an epistemically conscientious character. Here I
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will present two such accounts, and attempt to demonstrate the superiority of my own in
minimizing doxastic blame.
The first alternative approach to minimizing such harms is to attack one’s belief set
directly, eliminating all those epistemically flawed beliefs which could produce harms. One
account which may serve as an example of this is provided by Scott Stapleford. Stapleford
argues that we have an epistemic duty to believe rationally, and that this duty can only be
fulfilled by careful introspection and evaluation of the logical relations that hold between our
beliefs and evidence.102 The best possible fulfillment of our epistemic duties for Stapleford is the
cultivation of a maximally consistent belief set (that is, internally consistent and consistent with
the evidence available to us). If one managed to achieve this to a high degree it would seem that
they would have no blameworthy beliefs, and thus believed responsibly. 103
To meet this objection, I return to an argument I have made above. In minimizing the
harms we inflict upon our epistemic community through our beliefs, it is not sufficient to merely
have beliefs that are in perfect accord with our evidence and with each other. We are sometimes
also obligated to have certain beliefs as a result of the roles we fill; failing to acquire these
beliefs can often result in serious harms for which one will be blameworthy regardless of
whether or not they have done anything bad epistemically. While such criteria may provide
better protocols for agents to develop practically or epistemically, I consider neither of these the
appropriate ends for responsible believers.104
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Alternatively, one could devise a reliabilist approach to responsible belief rather than the
responsibilist one I have provided. Whereas responsibilists emphasize the importance of
intellectual traits of character (such as intellectual courage), reliabilists emphasize the traits of a
person which are reliably truth conducive (such as good memory or sense perception). 105 Given
this, a reliabilist could argue that in conscientiousness I have selected a virtue that is largely
irrelevant to responsible belief. Instead, they might argue that developing reliable traits of
intellectual character would more effectively produce fewer harmful beliefs (and thus a more
responsible believer) than becoming epistemically conscientious.
To meet this objection, I point to the conclusion reached above: all cases of unexcused
doxastic blame are either due to epistemic akrasia or carelessness, whereas all other cases of
harmful belief are excused. While how well one’s prowess of reasoning or evidence gathering
may minimize how many harmful beliefs they have, harmful beliefs do not exhaust the
considerations that factor into blameworthy belief. On the other hand, epistemic
conscientiousness provides a much more direct remedy to blameworthy belief; an epistemically
conscientious believer has developed a regard for the truth which prevents them from giving into
akrasia, and by extension a vigilance which minimizes their carelessness.
Jason Baehr provides some insights which may help articulate this more clearly. Baehr
regards responsibilist virtues like conscientiousness as “involving a person’s agency: to exercise
a character virtue is, for example, to deliberate and to choose in a certain way [emphasis
original].”106 These are contrasted with reliabilist virtues, which he notes as describing wellfunctioning “input-output devices” in a much more mechanistic way. 107 This recalls the
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distinction between evaluating someone as blameworthy and blaming that I made in a prior
chapter.
I see Baehr’s description of responsibilist and reliabilist virtues as perfectly in line with
this distinction. Recall that in order to blame someone for violating a doxastic norm there must
have been the opportunity for them to avoid their violation through their own agency. The fact
that Baehr points to responsibilist virtues as engaging with one’s agency and choice shows that it
is liable to blame proper. On the other hand, his description of reliabilist virtues as mechanistic
and automatic shows that blame for the failure to exercise reliabilist virtues is strictly limited to
the recognition of a norm violation, and thus irrelevant to whether a believer is responsible. To
articulate this differently still, I regard it a much more insidious (and therefore blameworthy) act
for one to impose harms upon their epistemic community by their own choice rather than lack of
skill.
To summarize, I have argued here that responsible believers are defined by their ability to
minimize the blame they incur as the result of their beliefs; doxastic blame is appropriate when
one generates harms in their greater epistemic community without being excused (through
ignorance, compulsion, or inability which is not itself blameworthy). While functioning reliably
epistemically or having epistemically flawless beliefs certainly contributes to this goal, Peels
argument noted above makes clear that they do so only tangentially. Resistance to such cases of
doxastic akrasia and carelessness is stymied directly only by the cultivation of epistemic
conscientiousness. Thus, responsible believers are epistemically conscientious believers.
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Conclusion
The best way to encapsulate this account lies in the conclusion of the last section: a
responsible believer is one who believes carefully, or in other words one who navigates their
epistemic life with special attention to what the truth (and not their own interests) and their
position within their epistemic community demands of them. Insofar as one abides by this
maxim, they can believe blamelessly and thereby responsibly.
To reiterate, I arrived at this conclusion by first examining whether and when we could
be held responsible for the beliefs which we adopt and maintain. I concluded that in virtue of the
harms which our beliefs are capable of exposing our epistemic community to, we are nearly
always responsible (i.e. answerable) for the beliefs we adopt and hold. Following on this, I
examined how blame operated in doxastic contexts, concluding that practices of blaming others
for adopting or holding incorrect beliefs was appropriate for similar reasons. The major
limitation on such blame is the degree of control available to a believer in coming to adopt and
hold a belief; I argued that blame directed at the formation of a belief over which a believer had
no control (e.g. by compulsion) is incoherent and does not reflect a legitimate practice of blame.
In the latter chapters of this book, I applied these analyses to the examination of which
obligations we had as believers and how we could best go about fulfilling them. I concluded that
again, in virtue of the harms that our beliefs may generate, most of our doxastic obligations are a
species of moral obligation and are thus more expansive and more binding than many have
previously thought. Nevertheless, these obligations are (as noted in the discussion of blame)
sometimes excused by a lack of control or ignorance. Crucially, from these excusing conditions I
concluded that the true locus of doxastic blame was a variety of epistemic akrasia (or
carelessness) wherein we recognize that an intended doxastic act violates the norms to which we
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are beholden but choose to do it anyway. This led me to the conclusion highlighted above: the
best means of being a responsible believer is the cultivation of epistemic care- deference to the
truth and cognizance of one’s role and impact in their greater epistemic community.
In these discussions, I hope to have offered some new legitimacy and perspective to our
practices of doxastic blame. In an increasingly hostile and partisan world in which all cling
defensively to their beliefs, it does us great justice to remember the stakes involved and harms
imposed on others by leading epistemically vicious lives; it is important to remember that the
price of the comfort in which we indulge by clinging to the ways of thinking familiar and easy to
us is always paid by someone else.
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